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In the long term, ﬁ  rms face two types of ﬁ  nancial deci-
sions. The ﬁ   rst concerns which investments to effect, 
known in the literature as capital budgeting, and the 
second concerns how to ﬁ   nance those investments. A 
ﬁ  rm generally has a range of ways of ﬁ  nancing its real 
investments, such as the use of internal resources, bor-
rowing or share issues. This article concentrates on that 
last source of ﬁ  nance, and aims more speciﬁ  cally to ana-
lyse the role of equities in the ﬁ  nancing of non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations in Belgium, in terms of both their importance 
and the underlying factors determining that choice.
The ﬁ  rst section of this article analyses the position of 
equities in the ﬁ  nancing  of  non-ﬁ  nancial  corporations 
in Belgium on the basis of the ﬁ  nancial  accounts.  It 
then examines the respective importance of quoted and 
unquoted shares.
The second section deals with the determinants of the 
capital structure and examines the factors which may 
cause ﬁ  rms to opt for equity ﬁ  nancing. The presentation 
of the capital structure theory in general is followed by an 
empirical analysis of the capital structure of non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations in Belgium.
Finally, the third section discusses how macroeconomic 
variables, such as real and ﬁ  nancial  investment  and 
ﬁ  nancing costs, inﬂ  uence the timing of share issues. That 
analysis is based on an estimate of the cost to Belgian 
ﬁ  rms of issuing quoted shares.
1.   Financing of non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations in Belgium
1.1 Overview
Share issues represent an important source of ﬁ  nance for 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations in Belgium. During the period 
1995-2005, they accounted for 32 p.c. of the cumula-
tive new liabilities of non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, namely 
27 p.c. for unquoted shares and other equity and 5 p.c. 
for quoted shares. They were the second most important 
source of ﬁ   nance, the primary source – representing 
51 p.c. of the total – being non-bank credit, which 
essentially covers loans from other Belgian and foreign 
non-ﬁ   nancial corporations. Non-ﬁ  nancial  corporations 
also make use, albeit to a lesser extent, of bank credit and 
the issue of ﬁ   xed-income securities, which represented 
respectively 9 and 7 p.c. of the total cumulative ﬁ  nancing 
ﬂ  ows for the period 1995-2005.
Compared to the ﬁ  nancing structure of Belgian ﬁ  rms in 
the past, the last decade produced a decline in the impor-
tance of the role played directly by banks, and a strong 
growth of the ﬂ  ow of funds between ﬁ  rms, both afﬁ  li-
ated and non-afﬁ  liated companies, and both Belgian and 
foreign  ; these ﬂ  ows of funds took the form of loans or 
equity investments. Direct recourse to the ﬁ  nancial mar-
kets, via the issue of quoted shares or ﬁ  xed-income secu-
rities, remained stable in the overall ﬁ  nancing structure 
of Belgian ﬁ  rms, although – as this article will proceed 
to illustrate – there were nevertheless certain periods of 
low volumes followed by periods when large volumes of 













CHART 1  FINANCIAL LIABILITIES OF NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS IN BELGIUM
  (Breakdown by instrument, percentages of the total)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Includes certain trade credit and transitory items.
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CHART 2  ISSUE OF UNQUOTED SHARES BY BELGIAN 
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS AND NET 
ACQUISITIONS BY FOREIGNERS
  (Quarterly flows, billions of euro)
Source : NBB.
On the basis of the partial statistics available for the euro 
area, it seems that, over the past ten years, Belgian ﬁ  rms 
have raised more ﬁ  nance via unquoted share issues and 
less by borrowing (bank credit and corporate bonds taken 
together), than ﬁ  rms in the euro area. Overall, recourse 
to the stock market was more or less the same as in the 
euro area.
The statistics on ﬂ   ows of quoted and unquoted share 
issues discussed in this article cover the cash contributions 
made at the time of the establishment of a company or a 
capital increase, and the cash issue premiums at the time 
of a capital increase less the capital reductions in the form 
of repayments to shareholders. Contributions in kind, 
delistings, bankruptcies and admissions to listing without 
the issue of new shares are not included in the ﬂ  ow statis-
tics but do inﬂ  uence the statistics on outstanding totals.
1.2 Unquoted  shares
Share issues by Belgian ﬁ   rms consist mainly  –  over 
85 p.c. – of unquoted shares and other equity.
There are sometimes very different motives and circum-
stances underlying the issue of unquoted shares. For 
instance, it seems that foreign direct investment repre-
sented a major part of these issue ﬂ  ows, as is evident from 
the combined movement in these two variables since the 
mid-1990s. These ﬂ  ows are probably attributable to fairly 
large ﬁ   rms, which may be afﬁ   liated with one another 
or linked to foreign companies which supply them with 
funds by buying their shares or acquiring a stake in their 
capital. The coordination centres based in Belgium, which 
channel funds to both Belgian and foreign companies, are 
ﬁ  nanced mainly by the issue of unquoted shares, and are 
thus at the root of a large proportion of these ﬂ  ows.
As a result, 45 p.c. of the stock of unquoted shares 
issued by Belgian non-ﬁ  nancial corporations is now held 
by non-residents, whereas at the end of 1995 that ﬁ  gure 
was only 25 p.c.  ; at the same time, cross-shareholdings 
by other resident non-ﬁ  nancial corporations represented 
44 p.c. of that total at the end of 2005, against 35 p.c. 
ten years earlier.37
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CHART 3  HOLDING OF UNQUOTED SHARES ISSUED BY 
BELGIAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
  (Breakdown by holding sector, percentages of the total)
Source : NBB.
Unquoted shares may also be acquired by professional 
investors who are willing to operate in non-liquid markets 
in order to take advantage of the strong growth potential 
offered by certain companies. This form of ﬁ  nancing, 
which is often geared to businesses in the initial stages 
of their development, is more commonly known as ven-
ture capital. Nonetheless, the amounts involved are fairly 
small from an aggregate viewpoint  : on the basis of data 
issued by the European Venture Capital Association, it 
seems that around 4 billion euro was invested in Belgian 
ﬁ  rms by European venture capital companies during the 
period 1999-2005, representing just 1.2 p.c. of their total 
new liabilities. The Belgian venture capital market is still 
much smaller than the European average. Over half the 
funds granted to Belgian companies during the period 
1999-2005 came from venture capital companies based 
abroad.
Finally, unquoted shares are also issued by small companies 
which are not well known and therefore have more dif-
ﬁ  culty in gaining access to the stock markets. These ﬁ  rms 
generally have a family shareholder structure, and are 
often reluctant to open up their capital for fear of losing 
control. Assuming that family share issues are mainly 
subscribed by the households sector, it seems that  –  over 
the past decade  –  such issues have declined considerably, 
compared to issues relating to foreign investments or 
venture capital. Thus, the proportion of Belgian house-
holds in the holding of the stock of unquoted shares 
issued by Belgian companies declined from 37 p.c. at the 
end of 1995 to 10 p.c. at the end of 2005.
1.3 Quoted  shares
Belgian ﬁ   rms make far less frequent use of the stock 
market than of unquoted share issues. Even during the 
stock market euphoria of the late 1990s, quoted shares 
never represented more than 7 p.c. of their new ﬁ  nancial 
liabilities.
This low volume of share issues should be viewed in the 
light of the relatively small number of listed Belgian com-
panies. At the end of July 2006, there were 130 Belgian 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations whose shares were listed on 
Euronext, including 12 on the Free Market and 3 on 
Alternext. After reaching a peak in 2000, when no fewer 
than 152 Belgian non-ﬁ  nancial corporations were listed 
– including 13 on Easdaq  /  Nasdaq –, this number had 
declined until 2004. In 2005 there was a marked accel-
eration in the stock market launch of Belgian companies, 
with no fewer than 13 newcomers. This trend continued 
in the ﬁ  rst seven months of 2006, when there were nine 
new introductions of Belgian companies on Euronext.
Mainly large companies are admitted to the stock 
exchange, since the size criterion is undoubtedly impor-
tant. Introduction onto the stock market is associated 
with speciﬁ  c requirements, particularly those concerning 
ﬁ  nancial aspects, accounting and transparency, which are 
more onerous for small company budgets. Also, in order 
to attract investors, the instruments issued must be sufﬁ  -
ciently liquid, and that means making a minimum quantity 
of securities available to the public. That is why admission 
to a regulated market is generally conditional upon a 
minimum amount of freely tradable capital (free ﬂ  oat) or 
a minimum volume of capital to be acquired.
However, the Belgian economic fabric is typiﬁ  ed by a large 
number of small and medium-sized ﬁ  rms. That is reﬂ  ected 
in the relatively modest number of Belgian companies in the 
Euronext European indices with the largest capitalisations, 
namely the Euronext 100 and Next 150 : at 11 July 2006, 
11 Belgian companies representing 8.4 p.c. of the 
market capitalisation of the index, were included in 
the Euronext 100 while 22, representing 12.8 p.c. of 
the market capitalisation of the index, were listed in 
Next 150. Conversely, there was a stronger Belgian pres-
ence in the indices which use criteria other than size, 
such as NextPrime and NextEconomy, which respectively 
comprise companies active in the traditional sectors and in 38
TABLE 1 PRESENCE OF BELGIAN COMPANIES (1) IN THE MAIN EURONEXT INDICES
(Data as at 11 July 2006)
Number of companies 
in the index
Belgian companies 
in the index 
(number)
Belgian companies 




100 largest capitalisations ................................. 100 11 8.4
Next 150
Next 150 capitalisations .................................. 150 22 12.8
NextPrime
Traditional sectors ........................................ 117 36 30.1
NextEconomy
New economy ........................................... 109 18 23.4
Source: Euronext.
(1) All companies listed on Euronext, including banks and ﬁnancial holding companies.
the new economy, satisfying stringent criteria in terms of 
ﬁ  nancial transparency : 36 Belgian companies (30.1 p.c. of 
the market capitalisation of the index) on NextPrime and 
18 Belgian companies (23.4 p.c. of the market capitalisa-
tion of the index) on NextEconomy. In the light of these 
ﬁ   gures, medium-sized Belgian ﬁ   rms appear to be well 
represented on Euronext in comparison with their French, 
Dutch and Portuguese counterparts.
However, smaller organisations are being encouraged 
to open up their shareholdership by the recent creation 
of markets or indices appropriate to them. On Euronext 
Brussels, for example, there are the Bel Mid and Bel 
Small indices, introduced on 1 March 2005, and the 
compartments of the Free Market and Alternext, created 
in November 2004 and June 2006 respectively. These 
developments coincided with the desire of international 
investors to shift their investments into smaller compa-
nies, generally focusing more on the domestic market and 
less sensitive to the international, macroeconomic climate, 
especially in periods of great uncertainty.
Aimed at promoting SMEs in an expansion phase, the 
Euronext Brussels Free Market is, as its name implies, 
unregulated, i.e. it keeps the requirements imposed on 
new entrants to a strict minimum. In particular, there is 
no minimum capitalisation, no minimum free ﬂ  oat,  no 
obligation to publish interim results and no need to con-
form to the IFRS standards  ; the only requirements which 
must be met are a prospectus approved by the BFIC and 
compliance with the traditional rules on investor protec-
tion. During the twenty or so months since its establish-
ment, no fewer than 12 Belgian SMEs with a market 
capitalisation of less than 25 million euro have been 
admitted, and several more introductions are expected in 
the second half of 2006.
Alternext, which occupies an intermediate position 
between the regulated market Eurolist and the Free 
Market in terms of admission requirements and listing 
requirements, is aimed primarily at substantial SMEs, 
because companies are only admitted if they were estab-
lished at least two years previously and wish to raise a 
minimum of 2.5 million euro – unless a prior private 
placing has been arranged in the preceding two years 
for a total of 5 million euro or more. The listing require-
ments are less strict than on Eurolist, the main difference 
being the absence of any obligation to adhere to the IFRS 
model.
However, an institutional factor may continue to have an 
adverse effect on the issue of quoted shares : the Belgian 
legislation on commercial companies does not ensure 
effective separation between the right of ownership 
and the right to vote at the general meetings, so that 
there is less protection against undesirable shareholders. 
Consequently, few business owners could be inclined to 
open up more than half of their capital for fear of losing 
control, and that may lead to an inadequate free ﬂ  oat.39
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TABLE 2  EURONEXT BRUSSELS : THREE SEPARATE, COMPLEMENTARY MARKETS
Source : Euronext.
2.  Determinants of the capital structure
2.1  The capital structure theory
Companies have various ways of ﬁ  nancing their invest-
ments, such as internal resources, borrowing or share 
issues. The question is whether there is an optimum mix of 
these options which maximises the value of the company. 
In other words, can ﬁ  rms determine an optimum capital 
structure ? According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), that 
is not the case and, under certain conditions, the capital 
structure does not inﬂ  uence the value of the company. 
However, the capital structure is important in practice. 
There are various reasons for this, such as taxation or the 
costs associated with bankruptcy (trade-off theory), asym-
metric information (pecking order theory) and conﬂ  icts of 
interest between stakeholders (agency theory).
Taxes are a ﬁ   rst reason why the choice of ﬁ  nance  is 
important. Firms can in fact deduct from their taxable 
income the interest charges on their borrowings, thus 
creating a “tax shield”. This inﬂ  uences the ﬁ  rm’s value 
and encourages the use of borrowing rather than the 
issue of shares. This advantage may be partly offset for 
the investor if interest income attracts a higher rate of 
tax than dividends or capital gains on shares. Generally 
speaking, however, it should be noted that ﬁ  rms borrow 
in order to make use of the tax shield (1), but that situation 
cannot continue indeﬁ  nitely since over-use of debt also 
entails certain costs. It puts a business at greater risk of 
ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties, of being unable to repay its debts or 
of becoming bankrupt. This illustrates the theory of the 
capital structure trade-off, which thus predicts moderate 
debt ratios. More speciﬁ  cally, a ﬁ  rm increases its debt until 
the marginal value of the tax advantage is exactly offset 
by an increase in the (discounted) value of the costs relat-
ing to ﬁ  nancial problems (2).
The pecking order theory looks at the capital structure 
from a different angle, on the basis of asymmetric infor-
mation. The basic model was developed by Myers and 
Majluf (1984). These authors assume that investors do 
not know the true value of the assets of a business or its 
investment opportunities, whereas the managers do have 
that information and act in the interests of the existing 
shareholders. The fact that a company is issuing new 
shares may then mean one of two things. The company 
may have an attractive investment opportunity and is 
looking for ways to fund it. However, it is also possible 
that the manager is aware that the assets are overvalued 
and is trying to issue overvalued shares. The presence of 
asymmetric information prevents the investor from distin-
guishing between these two possibilities. That creates an 
equilibrium in which ﬁ  rms can only issue shares at a lower 
price. The undervaluation of equity ﬁ  nancing is therefore 
(1)  Measures such as the deduction of notional interest naturally inﬂ  uence this 
conclusion and make share issues more attractive.
(2)  This type of costs includes reorganisation expenses, the cost of reduced solvency 
and bankruptcy, but also agency costs (see below).40
(1)  Obviously, the problem disappears if the manager is also the owner and 
shareholder of the business.
(2)  In the case of an LBO, a company’s shares are bought, e.g. by a venture capital 
company, and the deal is ﬁ  nanced by borrowing (bank loans or bonds). Owing to 
the relatively large proportion of debt on completion of such a transaction, bonds 
issued in these circumstances are generally accorded a low rating (often “junk 
bond” status).
linked to the level of asymmetric information, making 
share issues more expensive and giving rise to the capital 
structure pecking order (cf. e.g. Myers, 2001) :
–   Firms prefer internal to external ﬁ  nancing ;
–   Dividends are rigid so that it is difﬁ  cult to reduce them 
in order to ﬁ  nance projects. In the short run, changes in 
ﬁ  nancing requirements cannot be covered by adjusting 
dividends. Consequently, net cash ﬂ  ow ﬂ  uctuations are 
reﬂ  ected in changes in the need for external ﬁ  nancing.
–   If external ﬁ  nance is needed, ﬁ  rms will opt ﬁ  rst for the 
source which is safest for investors, namely borrowing.
–   When more funds are required, ﬁ  rms will go through 
the pecking order, from safe to riskier debt, by issuing 
convertible bonds or preference shares and – as a last 
resort – traditional shares.
Agency costs arise because of conﬂ   icts of interests 
between different parties. There are two types of conﬂ  ict 
that are relevant for the choice of the capital structure  : 
the conﬂ   ict between shareholders and managers, and 
the conﬂ  ict between shareholders and creditors. The ﬁ  rst 
type of conﬂ   ict arises because managers generally act 
in their own interests. For example, they may invest in 
unattractive projects (e.g. producing a return of less than 
the cost of capital) or waste the assets in “organisational 
inefﬁ  ciencies”, as suggested by Jensen’s free cash ﬂ  ow 
theory (1986). One example might be a project which 
enhances the manager’s prestige (e.g. a corporate aircraft) 
while being of little economic value. Although remunera-
tion systems, share options, etc. offer a partial solution 
to the problem, the objectives of the managers are never 
perfectly in harmony with those of the shareholders  (1). 
Debt may help in this respect : the ﬁ  rm is required to pay 
interest, and the manager’s power over the cash ﬂ  ow is 
therefore limited. Leveraged buy-outs  (2) (LBOs) are one 
example. Following an LBO, the managers have to cut 
down on unproductive investments and generate cash. 
This shows that, although a high debt ratio does entail 
risks, it may also have its advantages. One positive side-
effect of debt is that bankruptcy seriously damages a 
manager’s reputation. A high level of debt encourages 
him to work harder, to invest in better projects and curb 
the inefﬁ  cient use of the cash ﬂ  ow in order to reduce the 
risk of bankruptcy and preserve his reputation.
Apart from the divergent objectives of managers and 
shareholders, conﬂ  icts of interest may also arise between 
shareholders and creditors. However, they occur only if 
there is a high risk of payment default or ﬁ  nancial prob-
lems. That is mainly the case if the managers, as is often 
assumed, act in the interests of the shareholders rather 
than the creditors. If the risk of bankruptcy increases, 
the managers will be inclined to act such that the value 
is transferred from the creditors to the shareholders. 
There are various ways of achieving that (see Brealey and 
Myers, 2003 or Myers, 2001). First, the managers can 
invest in higher-risk projects. That increases the potential 
return for the shareholders, whereas much of the higher 
risk is borne by the creditors. This risk transfer behaviour 
was modelled for the ﬁ  rst time by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Secondly managers may refrain from certain 
investments which would need to be ﬁ  nanced by share 
issues, as part of the proceeds would in fact revert to 
the creditors. Myers (1977) looks more in depth at this 
problem of under-investment. Thirdly, managers may 
try to gain time by concealing ﬁ  nancial problems which 
might alarm the creditors, who could insist on bankruptcy 
or corporate restructuring. Finally, managers may try to 
borrow even more and pay the cash obtained to the 
shareholders. Creditors are aware of these problems and 
try to conclude contracts which counterbalance for these 
four points. However, contracts are never perfect.
2.2 Empirical  analysis
The preceding section reviewed the factors determin-
ing the choice of corporate ﬁ   nance from a theoretical 
perspective. In this section we shall conduct an empirical 
analysis of the determinants explaining the method of 
ﬁ  nancing chosen by Belgian ﬁ  rms, with speciﬁ  c emphasis 
on equity ﬁ  nancing.
2.2.1 Methodology
On the basis of the theoretical literature mentioned above 
and existing empirical studies, the following possible 
determinants of equity ﬁ  nancing for ﬁ  rm i during year t, 
quoted by Eqi, t  , were selected :
–   Lev  : the ﬁ   rm’s debt level, i.e. the long-term debts 
divided by the total assets ;
–   Size  : the natural logarithm of the total assets, a 
measure of the ﬁ  rm’s size ;
–   Internal  : the volume of internal resources divided by 
the total assets ;
–    Intang : the volume of intangible ﬁ  xed assets divided by 
the total assets ;
–   Quoted  : a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
the ﬁ  rm is quoted on the stock market and 0 if it is 
not.41
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TABLE 3 OVERVIEW OF THE VARIABLES (1)
Symbol Variable Item
Eq ............ Capital + issue premiums 10 + 11
Lev ........... Long-term debt 17 + 42
Size ........... Size In (20/58)
Internal ........ Internal resources 12 + 13 + 14
Intang ......... Intangible ﬁxed assets 21
Quoted ........ Quoted company
(1) This table shows the variables used in equation (1). The Item column refers
to the balance sheet items used to measure the variable. Eq, Lev, Internal and
Intang are divided by the total assets.
(1)  For each NACE sector, a variable is included which is equal to 1 if ﬁ  rm i in year 
t belongs to that sector and 0 if it does not. A variable is also deﬁ  ned for each 
year, equal to 1 for the year concerned and 0 for the other years. To avoid perfect 
multicolinearity in the estimations, one sector and one year have been omitted 
from the model speciﬁ  cation.
(2)  Technically, this is referred to as an “unbalanced panel”.
Table 3 offers a detailed view of the different variables. 
By combining all the elements, we obtain the following 
equation :
t i
t i t i
t i t i t i t i
u year dummies
industry dummies Quoted Intang
Internal Size Lev Eq
,
, 5 , 4
, 3 , 2 , 1 0 ,
+ +
+ + +
+ + + =
β β
β β β β
 
(1)
in which the indices refer to ﬁ  rm i and year t. βi denotes 
the regression coefﬁ  cients to be estimated, and ui,t the 
error terms. The dummies relating to the sector to which 
the ﬁ  rm belongs are based on the NACE 1-digit codes ; a 
dummy is also introduced for each year (1).
2.2.2  Description of the sample
The equity ﬁ   nancing determinants are analysed on the 
basis of a sample of Belgian companies, over the period 
from 2000 to 2004. For each of those years, all Belgian 
ﬁ  rms publishing their annual accounts in the full format 
were included. It should be noted that a ﬁ  rm does not 
necessarily appear in the sample every year. For example, 
if the ﬁ  rm was not established until after 2000, or if it 
went bankrupt during the period in question, it will not 
be included every year  (2). Altogether, the dataset con-
tains 28,594 individual ﬁ  rms, the ﬁ  gure varying between 
17,292 and 18,208 ﬁ  rms in any year. For each ﬁ  rm, vari-
ables relating to the balance sheet were selected in order 
to conduct an empirical test on the theories mentioned 
earlier. This information was obtained from the database 
of the National Bank’s Central Balance Sheet Ofﬁ  ce.
2.2.3 Results
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are shown 
in table 4. Various versions of the model were estimated 
in order to verify the robustness of the estimations. More 
speciﬁ   cally, each of the variables considered was intro-
duced separately in models 1 to 5 (in addition to a con-
stant). Model 6 included all the variables. The coefﬁ  cients 
of the year and sector dummies are not shown in table 4. 
The models were estimated by the least squares method. 
White standard errors are shown in brackets in the table. 
All coefﬁ  cients are signiﬁ  cant at 5 p.c.
The results obtained show that the conclusions are robust 
for the different model variants. Moreover, the (adjusted) 
R² is in line with other studies on leverage, and the model 
is highly signiﬁ  cant (the F-statistic was not reported).
The analysis indicates that the quantity of intangible ﬁ  xed 
assets and stock market listing are positive determinants 
of equity ﬁ  nancing. In other words, quoted ﬁ  rms which 
own more intangible ﬁ  xed assets will be more inclined to 
ﬁ  nance their investments by issuing shares.
Conversely, other variables exhibit a negative correlation. 
Firms with a high debt level will use less shares. Moreover, 
large ﬁ  rms make less use of equity ﬁ  nancing. One pos-
sible explanation is that such ﬁ  rms have readier access to 
bank loans and / or they resort to issuing bonds. Firms with 
greater internal resources issue fewer shares.
A more detailed analysis of the results will reveal the 
extent to which they correspond to the capital structure 
theories mentioned earlier (trade-off, pecking order and 
agency theories). More speciﬁ  cally, if the sign of the result 
shown in table 4 corresponds to a particular theory, that 
will be indicated.
The negative sign of Lev is explained by the agency theory. 
In the event of ﬁ  nancial problems, managers may refrain 
from making certain investments which would have been 
ﬁ  nanced by issuing shares, because part of the proceeds 
would revert to the creditors.
The negative coefﬁ  cient of Size can be explained by the 
trade-off theory, because the larger ﬁ  rms have a higher 
tax bill which they can reduce by deducting the interest 
charges. The fact that large ﬁ   rms have been in exist-
ence for a long time and enjoy a good reputation may 
be reﬂ  ected in a better rating for their debt and  /  or an 42
TABLE 4 RESULTS (1)
Symbol Dependent variable: Eq
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
C ............. 0.445 1.335 0.378 0.386 0.388 0.951
(0.005) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.022)
Lev ........... –0.313 –0.299
(0.007) (0.009)
Size ........... –0.061 –0.034
(0.001) (0.002)
Internal ........ –0.221 –0.213
(0.016) (0.016)
Intang ......... 0.274 0.169
(0.036) (0.044)
Quoted ........ 0.242 0.336
(0.006) (0.002)
Adj. R 2 ........ 0.045 0.072 0.266 0.025 0.025 0.308
(1) This table shows the results of the estimations of equation (1). Models 1 to 5 include the explanatory variables one at a time, while model 6 includes all the variables
which are deﬁned in Table 3. The white standard errors are shown in brackets. Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are shown in bold.
apparently reduced risk of ﬁ  nancial problems. They there-
fore have easier access to credit and can take on larger 
debts, so that there is less incentive to issue shares.
The negative link between equity ﬁ  nance and the variable 
Internal is in line with the three theories. The trade-off 
theory predicts that ﬁ  rms have fewer ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties 
and can take on higher levels of debt if they generate 
more internal resources. According to the pecking order 
theory, a ﬁ  rm without sufﬁ  cient internal resources has to 
use other forms of ﬁ  nance by working its way through the 
pecking order. The agency theory implies that an increase 
in the internal resources may tempt a manager to invest 
the money for unproductive purposes. Borrowing may be 
helpful here, so that debt ﬁ  nancing is preferred to equity 
ﬁ  nancing.
The positive coefﬁ  cient of Intang is in line with the trade-
off theory. In the event of ﬁ  nancial problems, intangible 
assets are more difﬁ  cult to realise than tangible assets. 
The ﬁ  rm is less able to contract debts and therefore has 
to make more use of equity ﬁ  nancing.
The agency theory explains the positive sign of Quoted. 
Potential investors can form a more accurate idea of a 
quoted company which increases its capital, compared 
to one which is not quoted. The greater transparency 
required of quoted companies reduces the problems 
of asymmetric information. It is therefore easier (and 
cheaper) to issue additional shares if a company is already 
quoted.
In conclusion, the study does not enable us to identify one 
single theory explaining the form of ﬁ  nancing chosen by 
Belgian ﬁ  rms ; instead, that choice is based on a combina-
tion of factors taken from the various theories.
3.   Macroeconomic determinants of 
share issue volumes
Like ﬁ  nancial liabilities taken as a whole, the volumes of 
quoted or unquoted shares issued are highly cyclical. Over 
the past twenty years there have been at least two periods 
of rapid growth in share issues, deﬁ  ned by issue volumes 
exceeding the long-term trend. The ﬁ  rst occurred at the 
end of the 1980s for quoted shares and slightly later, in 
the early 1990s, for unquoted shares. The second began 
in the late 1990s and continued until 2001. Those periods 
of accelerating issues were followed by varying periods 
of substantial deceleration, as in the period 1993-1997 
and in the years 2002 and 2003. More recently, the issue 
volume has increased again.
The periods of intense stock market activity in terms of 
issue volumes coincide with those in which the number of 
quoted companies is growing. Thus, between 1997 and 
2000, the number of quoted Belgian companies increased 
from 138 to 173, boosting the number of potential issuers 
by 25 p.c. The ensuing four years saw many companies 
disappear from the stock market, while new introduc-
tions were very rare, so that there was a net reduction of 
35 units in the number of quoted Belgian companies. 43
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CHART 4  ISSUES OF QUOTED AND UNQUOTED SHARES 
BY BELGIAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS




Unquoted shares and other equity
Finally, more recently, Belgian ﬁ  rms seem to be returning 
to the stock market, with 13 new introductions recorded 
in 2005, and 9 in the ﬁ   rst seven months of 2006. 
The parallel trend in the number of quoted ﬁ  rms and the 
volume of issues seems to show that, when conditions 
are favourable for equity ﬁ  nancing, not only the existing 
quoted companies step up their use of this form of ﬁ  nance, 
previously unquoted companies also decide to go public.
3.1  The role of real and ﬁ  nancial investments
There are various factors which motivate a ﬁ  rm’s decision 
to go public, one of the main ones being to obtain per-
manent funding to ﬁ  nance long-term real and ﬁ  nancial 
investments. A correlation is therefore to be expected 
between corporate investment behaviour and share issue 
volumes.
During the ﬁ  rst period when share issues were seen to 
increase, at the end of the 1980s, a parallel movement 
was observed in gross ﬁ  xed capital formation, where the 
annual growth rate exceeded 10 p.c. for three consecu-
tive years. Then followed a period of shrinking investment 
which corresponded to a very small volume of share 
issues. At the end of the 1990s, the parallelism of the two 
variables seemed to diminish, as gross ﬁ  xed capital forma-
tion, while expanding very rapidly, appeared to lag behind 
the exceptionally large volume of share issues.
Conversely, ﬁ   rms effected very substantial long-term 
ﬁ   nancial investments – including foreign direct invest-
ment  –  during this period, and more particularly 
in 2000. Moreover, the number of notiﬁ  cations submit-
ted in Belgium to the Competition Council concerning 
business concentrations conﬁ  rms the intense merger and 
acquisition activity prevailing at the time of the new mil-
lennium. Firms may also issue shares for the purpose of 
ﬁ  nancing the acquisition of other companies, either via 
the proceeds of issues for general subscription or by issu-
ing shares which are then exchanged for the shares in a 
target company.
Share issue volumes are linked to the business cycle by 
factors other than the direct channel of investment. Boom 
periods tend to coincide with periods of low risk aversion 
on the part of investors, periods when there is less marked 
asymmetry of information between managers and inves-
tors, reducing the cost of equity ﬁ  nancing. Moreover, it is 
clear that share issues are to a large extent related to stock 
market prices, which are in turn determined by the expec-
tation of future proﬁ  ts, and those proﬁ  ts are themselves 
connected with the pattern of activity and interest rates.
This leads to another key factor determining the ideal 































































CHART 5  QUOTED SHARE ISSUES AND REAL AND 
FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS OF BELGIAN 
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS




Gross fixed capital formation
(annual percentage change) 
Formation of long-term financial
assets
Quoted share issues (right-hand scale) 44
3.2  The role of capital cost
A decisive factor in the choice of the optimum ﬁ  nanc-
ing structure for a ﬁ  rm, which may therefore determine 
whether it becomes a quoted company, is the relative 
cost of each of the instruments at its disposal. Apart from 
the ﬁ  xed launch costs  –  production of a prospectus, pos-
sible adjustments to the accounting scheme, etc. – and 
compliance with the listing requirements, particularly 
those concerning information and transparency, ﬁ  nancing 
by means of quoted shares tends to be more expensive 
than ﬁ  nancing via borrowing, in view of the risk premium 
required by shareholders and because the different tax 
treatment usually favours borrowing rather than equity.
3.2.1 Theoretical  framework
While the ﬁ  nancial cost of bank credit or bond issues is 
easy to measure on the basis of the corresponding interest 
rates, the cost of a share issue is harder to estimate, since 
it has to include the expected future dividends, which 
are – by deﬁ  nition – uncertain and therefore subject to 
a risk premium.
The yardstick used here to measure the cost of equity 
ﬁ  nancing is based on a simple dividend discount model, 
in accordance with the classical Gordon-Shapiro formula 
which states that, in equilibrium, the value of a share 
must equal the discounted value of the expected future 
dividend ﬂ   ows. The discount rate, which may also be 
interpreted as the yield demanded by the investor, cor-
responds to the cost of ﬁ  nancing entailed in issuing the 
security. That discount rate comprises a risk-free interest 
rate and a risk premium.
In accordance with certain simplifying assumptions – in 
particular, the assumption that dividends increase at a 
constant rate  –  it is found that, in equilibrium, the cost of 
equity ﬁ  nancing depends only on the dividend yield and 
the long-term dividend growth rate.
While dividend yields can be observed ex post, the long-
term dividend growth rate has to be estimated. A classical 
assumption stipulates a long-term dividend growth rate 
equal to the potential growth rate of the economy. If the 
share of value added distributed to the capital and the 
pay-out ratio  –  i.e. the ratio between dividends paid and 
proﬁ  ts achieved  –  are stable over time, the real long-term 
dividend growth will be equal to the potential growth of 
the economy. Another solution is to take the net return 
on equity after tax (ROE) as reﬂ  ecting what the ﬁ  rm has 
available for spending after payment of all expenses and 
taxes, and to multiply that ratio by the fraction of prof-
its reinvested in the business. Assuming that the ﬁ  rm’s 
net investments are ﬁ  nanced solely out of undistributed 
proﬁ  ts, the rate obtained corresponds to the long-term 
dividend growth rate.
The cost of equity (or COE) for quoted Belgian companies 
was calculated for the period from 1995 to the present 
day. It was assumed that the long-term dividend growth 
rate varies over time. During an initial four-year period, it 
is equal to 5.5 p.c., the rate obtained by multiplying the 
ROE of quoted companies (10.6 p.c.) by the undistributed 
share of the proﬁ  ts (64.1 p.c.), after adjusting for inﬂ  ation 
(1.8 p.c.). The calculations were based on the mean values 
of the different variables over the period considered. The 
second phase is a transitional period of eight years during 
which the dividend growth rate gradually tends towards 
an equilibrium value. Then comes the third and ﬁ  nal phase 
(in principle, inﬁ  nite) in which the dividend growth rate is 
equal to that equilibrium value, estimated on the basis of 
the potential growth rate of the economy (2.1 p.c.).
3.2.2   Inﬂ  uence of ﬁ  nancing costs on quoted share issues
The cost of equity is compared with the movement in the 
price of other sources of ﬁ  nance (bank loans and corpo-
rate bonds). In view of the important role of the assump-
tion made regarding the long-term dividend growth rate, 
but also the fact that this exercise disregards a whole 
range of expenses, such as those relating to various obli-
gations which must be met by companies admitted to the 
regulated stock market, and the distortions introduced by 
the tax system, which does not in fact accord the same 
treatment to the various forms of ﬁ  nancing,  attention 
should focus not so much on the respective levels of costs 
but on their relative movement over time.
The period examined can be divided into three phases  : 
from mid-1996 until spring 1999, the COE declined 
steadily, mainly as a result of the signiﬁ  cant rise in share 
prices. The low level of the risk premium demanded by 
the market during that period also lowered the cost of 
issuing bonds, while bank rates remained fairly stable. 
From mid-1999, all the ﬁ  nancing costs began to rise as the 
ﬁ  nancial markets ﬁ  rst anticipated and then incorporated 
successive increases in the ECB’s key interest rates. The 
rising cost of equity persisted until the autumn of 2002, 
when it peaked, while bank rates, which are closely linked 
to the key rates, continued to fall, reaching an all-time low 
in the spring of 2003. The cost of issuing corporate bonds 
remained at a high level until the end of 2002, before also 
beginning to fall. Apart from the deteriorating economic 
situation, this period was marred by various accounting 
scandals involving certain large foreign companies, caus-
ing the market to continue demanding an abnormally 
high risk premium. After the peak in the autumn of 2002, 45
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CHART 6  FINANCING COSTS OF NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS IN BELGIUM
  (Percentages)
Sources : Thomson Financial Datastream, NBB.
(1) Fixed-term  advance.
(2)  Loans of over 1 million euro, variable rate, initially fixed for a period of less than 
one year.
(3)  Yield on a BBB bond denominated in euro, maturity of five to seven years.
(4)  On the basis of the model explained in 3.2.1 ; with a dividend growth rate equal 
to 5.5 p.c. for the first four years and a transitional phase of eight years, after 





the COE declined before stabilising today at a level slightly 
below its long-run average.
Examination of the link between the deviation of the COE 
from its long-run average and the ﬂ  ows of quoted share 
issues reveals a negative correlation, albeit with a certain 
time lag. That is due partly to the method of annual 
ﬂ  ow smoothing, but is also attributable to the respective 
movement in the cost of other sources of funding  : e.g., 
in 1999 and 2000, bank rates and bond rates climbed 
much faster than the COE. During the long phase of very 
low issues, extending from early 2002 to mid-2004 – or 
even the end of 2004, when excluding the public offer to 
exchange Interbrew shares for Ambev shares, giving rise 
to the Inbev group – the COE was well above its long-run 
average value, and the movement in the price of alterna-
tive sources of funding was much more favourable.
Since mid-2005, the COE has been falling, in contrast 
to the movement in the price of other forms of ﬁ  nance, 
so that it is now slightly below its long-run value. At the 
same time, a number of non-ﬁ  nancial corporations seem 
to be showing renewed interest in raising ﬁ  nance by issu-
ing quoted shares. The launch of new segments, such as 
the Free Market and Alternext, has probably encouraged 
that development. The improvement in the business out-
look should continue to favour that trend.
The new system of deducting notional interest could give 
rise to a structural increase in equity ﬁ  nancing by Belgian 
companies. This measure, which came into effect on 
1 January 2006, allows ﬁ  rms to deduct from their taxable 
income an amount based on the value of their own funds, 
adjusted for certain balance sheet items, and using a rate 
equal to the annual average yield on linear bonds (OLOs). 
This ends the tax discrimination between ﬁ  nancing  by 
borrowing and equity ﬁ  nancing, and thus brings the costs 
of these two methods of ﬁ  nancing more closely into line.
Conclusion
Share issues are a signiﬁ  cant source of funding for non-
ﬁ  nancial corporations in Belgium. Between 1995 and 2005, 
they represented around 32 p.c. of the cumulative new 
liabilities of non-ﬁ  nancial corporations. Share issues are 



















































CHART 7  COST OF FINANCING BY THE ISSUE OF QUOTED 
SHARES AND FLOW OF ISSUES (1) BY BELGIAN 
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
Sources : Thomson Financial Datastream, NBB.
(1)  In view of the rather irregular quarterly profile of flows of quoted share issues, 
the flows were smoothed on an annual basis. Consequently, the flow in any 
particular quarter corresponds to the annual average calculated on the current 
quarter and the three preceding quarters.
Cost of financing by the issue of quoted shares 
(percentage deviation from the long-term mean) 
(right-hand scale)
Quoted shares issued by Belgian non-financial 
corporations (smoothed flows, billions of euro)
(left-hand scale) 46
the ﬁ   rst being non-bank credit, which accounted for 
51 p.c. of the total. Share issues are a much more 
important source of funding than bank loans or issues 
of ﬁ  xed-income securities. Unquoted shares represented 
the major part of this, namely 27 p.c., mainly because of 
the high level of foreign direct investment. Quoted shares 
represented only 5 p.c. of the cumulative new liabilities of 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations during the period 1995-2005.
An empirical analysis of the determinants of the capital 
structure highlights the fact that quoted companies 
having more intangible ﬁ  xed assets are more inclined to 
opt for equity ﬁ  nancing. Conversely, other factors, such as 
the company’s debt level, size and internal resources have 
a negative inﬂ  uence on equity ﬁ  nancing.
The timing of the use of this type of ﬁ  nancing depends 
partly on macroeconomic factors such as real and ﬁ  nan-
cial investments. The cost of capital may also be regarded 
as a key determinant of the use of equity ﬁ  nancing over 
time. Substantial issues were recorded during the period 
1999-2001 and from mid-2005 onwards. These develop-
ments coincided with either a cost of capital well below 
its long-run average or a movement in the cost of capital 
which was more favourable than the price of alterna-
tive sources of ﬁ  nance. The recent government measure 
aimed at allowing the deduction of notional interest could 
also give a substantial boost to new share issues.47
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